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The present paper aims to analyze the major changes in the German system of cross-holdings 
between banks and industrial or financial companies. After an overview on the role of banks in  
bank-based versus market-based financial systems, and on the German system of corporate control, 
we focus our attention on the relationship not only between banks and industrial companies, but 
also between financial companies in Germany. Discussing the reasons for cross-holdings within the 
financial sector, we hypothesize that cross-holdings are less efficient than full mergers. We analyze 
hypotheses about the structure of the “Deutschland AG” and about a different role of cross-
holdings at different levels of the German financial system. A test of hypotheses on recent mergers 
and acquisitions in the German financial system yields that they explain some of the changes in the 
cross-holdings occurred after 1994. We conclude that instead of the often referred “Macht der 
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1. Introduction 
The role of German banks in corporate governance has been the subject of many controversial 
discussions
1. Until the early nineties of the last century, the banks´ relations with the corporate 
sector were generally regarded as a positive element
 2, ensuring a good deal of long-termism
3, 
whereas the Anglo-Saxon countries were suffering from excessive hostile takeovers
4, and from 
focusing on short term results
5. But as the stock exchange boomed in the second part of the nineties 
the German system lost its appeal and was regarded as “inflexible and short of creativity...
6”, 
whereas now, after the stock crises of the new century, a new wave of interest  focuses on the 
German model. The literature tends to make a distinction between two main systems, an Anglo-
American system, and a German-Japanese system
7.   
The present paper aims to analyze the major changes in the German system of cross-holdings 
between banks and industrial and in particular, financial companies. It is divided into 6 chapters. 
In chapter 2, we discuss the major hypotheses about the role of banks in the two main financial 
systems: the market-based system and the bank-based system. We consider the features of the 
relationships between banks and non-financial firms in Germany, one of the corner stones of the so- 
called “Hausbank model”. 
In chapter 3, we provide some background information on the “two-tierd system” of corporate 
control we find in German companies. Our aim is to provide a legal frame for understanding the 
role of the Aufsichtsrat and of the Vorstand in German corporations, without a specific interest in 
financial or non-financial companies. 
In chapter 4, we analyze the motives for mergers between, and cross shareholdings among, financial 
companies. Our aim is to understand if there is any theoretical reason for the wider use of cross-
holdings among German financial companies if compared to financial institutions in other 
countries. In the literature we find some hypotheses, in particular, a historical explanation, a self 
defense explanation, an explanation connected with the “Hausbank model” and finally an 
explanation which focuses on the German social environment. 
In chapter 5, we analyze the major changes occurred in the German financial system since the 
1990’s. The first part focuses on the distinction between the “core companies of the financial 
system” and the other companies, also according to Wòjcik’s hypothesis that “the loss of block 
holdings is to be referred to external holdings, while the cross-holdings in the core, among the top 
owners themselves, remained largely unchanged”. In the second part we analyze the major changes 
according to three different tests: a legal test, which follows the definition of a controlling 
                                                           
1  For a critical view about the German model see among others: Capasso (1996); Mosetti (1996); Wenger, Kaserer, 
(1998), 41-78; Berlin (2000), 3-15; Boyd (1999), 655-662; Höfer, Hübner (1994), 106-112; Spaventa  (2002). 
  As supporters of the German corporate organization please see: Albert (1993); Nardozzi (1983), 118; Höpner 
(2001); Höpner, Jackson (2001); Lütz (2000). 
2  The Economist forecasts “a shift away from traditional Anglo-American capitalism to something much closer to the 
German model.” Cited by Schröder, Schrader (1998), 17-35. 
3  Guatri, Vicari (1994), 69. 
4  Since the Second World War there have been just a few hostile takeovers in Germany, and before the 90’s none. 
Among others see: Deutsch (2002). For a widespread empirical view on takeovers in Germany, please see: 
Jenkinson, Ljungqvist  (1999) and Franks, Mayer (1998), 1385-1403.  
5  Empirical studies proved that even if in the short run the ROA of companies with highly concentrated shareholders 
perform worst, in the long run their ROA shows the highest increase. Lehmann, Weigand (2000), 157-195. 
6  N.N. (1996). Among others see also: Wenger, Kaserer (1998), 41-78. 
7  Among others please see: Emmons, Schmid (1998), 19-42; Guatri, Vicari (1994).   2
shareholder according to § 328 AktG, a test of Wòjcik’s hypothesis, and a test that reflects 
Wenger’s and Kaserer’s hypotheses about the structure of the German financial system. We 
distinguish two periods, the years before 2000, and the period afterwards, in order to reflect the new 
attitude in the financial system after some major mergers and takeovers, and more in particular after 
the hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodaphone. 
In the last chapter, we draw conclusions about the structure of the center of the German financial 
system. 
2.   Financial Systems and the Role of Banks in Corporate Control 
The so-called Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-American) system, even if with some differences
8, is 
characterized by a huge number of institutional investors who have a short-term approach on 
investment and, according to it, focus their attention on annual and inter-annual results, and on 
return ratios (such as Roi, Roe, Rod, Eps, EBITDA,…)
9. At the same time companies finance 
themselves first of all through the capital market, while using banks´ credits in particular in order to 
finance day to day operations. On the contrary, the German-Japanese model is characterized by a 
small number of sizeable investors, mainly banks and insurance companies, which have a long-term 
investment approach
10 and are less committed with investigating how the managers manage the 
company
11. On the one hand they finance directly the companies´ long-term investments through 
long term credits, on the other hand they are often among the bigger shareholders of the companies 
they have financed
12. Moreover, while in the US it happens seldom that a single investor holds a 
control block of shares in a floated company, in Germany a vast majority of the floated companies 
have a single shareholder who owns 25% or more of the voting capital
13, and so has de facto
14 a 
veto’s power on the firm’s major decisions
15. 
Moreover, in the German system the problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard are 
limited by the role of the Aufsichtsrat to control the management’s behavior, and by the fact that a 
large part of the Aufsichtrat’s members have been bankers
16: in this way some scholars argued that 
German banks were well-positioned to monitor corporate management and represent the interest of 
all shareholders
17. 
                                                           
8  On the subject of differences between the English and the US systems please see: Franks, Mayer (2002). 
9  This is also due to the fact that mutual funds and investment trusts have to report their results to the investors at least 
once a year, but often every three or six months.  
10  As a consequence of this long-term behavior of the investors some authors underline that most of the changes in the 
company’s control  occur through block trades, while tender offers are rare. Schmid (2000), 35-46. At the same time 
it was stated that “Having financial institutions as largest shareholders of traded corporations enhanced 
profitability”. Lehmann, Weigand (2000). 
11  Breuer (2001), 544-548. 
12  As a matter of fact they can rely on the results of the companies´ day-to-day operations with the bank, but also they 
have access to information derived from corporate board membership. Wenger, Kaserer (1998). 
13  Gorton, Schmid (2002). According to Marco Becht in several countries, the median large voting stake in listed 
companies is over 50%, suggesting that voting control by large blockholders is the rule rather than an exception, 
while in no European country studied the median largest shareholder was small enough to fall below 5%. EGCN 
(1997). Edwards, Nibler (1999). 
14  For the implications of § 328 AktG please see the “Regulatory Environment part”. 
15  For an analysis of the role of minority shareblocks in German corporate governance please see: Jenkinson, 
Ljungqvist (1999). 
16  On the role of bank representatives in the Aufsichtsrat as a counterbalance to employee representatives see Gorton,  
Schmid (2002). 
17  Deeg (1998), 93-101.  3
Summing up, we can say that bank-oriented systems are normally characterized by less developed 
financial markets
18, in particular for risk capital, and so the saving is primarily transferred in the 
form of short-term and long-term credits through banking and savings institutions. On the contrary, 
in market-oriented systems banks provide primarily short-term credits while long-term funds are 
gathered through intermediate markets and risk capital
19. 
According to these differences some authors speak about a contrast between a market-based model 
and a credit based model. 
Tab. 1:  The differences between market-based and bank-based financial systems 
  Market-Based Bank-Based  Bank-Based 
  Arms` Length 





Total amount of stock market 
capitalisation as a percentage of 
the GDP 
High Low  Low 
Total amount of bank   loans as 
a percentage of the GDP 
Low High  High 
Total amount of stock market 
capitalisation owned by 
households (direct+indirect) 
High Low  Low 
Total amount of stock market 
capitalisation owned by banks 
(direct+indirect) 
Forbidden (According to the EU regula-
tions, a UK-based bank can invest in non-
financial firms, but not according to Bank 
of England regulations; In the USA the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allows 
banks to invest in commercial enterprises, 
with wider limits than in Continental 
Europe) 
High High 
Total amount of bank  loans as 
a percentage of the firms’ 
funding 
Low High  High 





Information to the Shareholders  High  Limited  Low 
Corporate Control   Vigorous, and takeover sanction  Little activity  Little activity 
Internal Control/Board of 
Directors 






Share Voting  Concentrated through investment funds 













According to most of the literature the major features of German bank-firm relationships, and so the 
basis of the so-called Deutschland AG system, are the following: 
                                                           
18  Boyd (1999), 655-662. 
19  Berglöf (1991), 117. 
20  Neuberger (1999), 11-26. 
21 Halpern  (1999).   4
•  Banks have a considerable influence over, and information about large, publicly traded firms, as 
they often have seats on the firms´ supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrat). 
•  Banks hold large portions of shares of non-financial firms. 
•  According to the “Hausbank model” the same bank provides most, or all, of the financing needs 
of a firm, which in return uses the services of just one bank. This tying is considered by both 
parts as a long-term relationship, with no connection with the cyclical up and down of the firm’s 
business
22.  
•  The German banking system has the capacity to provide industrial finance, that is, long-term 
capital for financing fixed assets, like plan and equipment
23. 
The influence of banks, through seats in companies’ Aufsichtsräten, the so-called “Macht der 
Banken” (power of the banks)
 24, has been the subject for a lot of studies but also political 
discussions
25.  The figures reveal that banks can exert influence via their supervisory board 
mandates, but the impact is easily overestimated, even if their role is still stronger than the one of 
their counterparts in other countries. 
Tab 2: Mandates in the boards of the biggest 100 companies in Germany 
  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Allianz  25 24 23 21 20 
Deutsche  Bank  15 11 18 21 20 
Dresdner  Bank  18 18 21 17 13 
Commerzbank 11  13  11  8  7 
Münchener  Rück  6  20 20 16 16 
HVB 10*  12*  15*  7  6 
AMB  10  3 3 1 1 
Total  85  101 111 101  83 
Source: Monopolkommission (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002) 
* We considered the amount of both the Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechselbank and the Bayerische Vereinsbank 
In contrast to their counterparts in many other countries, German banks hold sizeable investments in 
non-financial companies
26. This is both a consequence of the “underdevelopment” of the German 
                                                           
22  Some literature about the role of the German banks as shareholders considers them as main stakeholders nearby the 
management and the employees. Guatri, Vicari (1994). 
23  According to Vitols the German banks provide most of the corporate long-term loans through credits with a maturity 
of four to ten years. Vitols (1998), 79-91. 
24  This is in part due to the fact that before the Aktiengesellschaftsgesetz of 1965, which established a maximum 
number of 10 mandates per person, the most important bankers were sitting in a large number of boards. For 
example Hermann-Josef Abs, a former chief executive of Deutsche Bank AG, simultaneously held up to 30 seats on 
supervisory boards. Schröder, Schrader (1998), 20. For a complete knowledge of the role of Hermann Abs in the 
German financial sector please see: N.N. (1965), 10. 
25  Höfer, Hübner (1994), 106-112. 
26  In the U.S. and the U.K. banks don’t hold portfolios of long-term investments in non-financial companies. In 
particular see: Berlin (2000). In France most of the present investment took place during  the 80’s and the 90’s, due 
to the privatisation process in that period. It can be related to a preference for a core shareholder group privatisation 
pattern, even if the banks established preference banking relations with the companies; Magnani (1999), 159. In 
Italy banks were forbidden to hold investments in non-financial companies till 1991, when the so-called Legge 
Amato-Carli was passed. The sole exception was Mediobanca, which acted as a special middle-long term bank, and 
since the 50’s acquired shares in non-financial companies. The author would like to underline that as a matter of fact 
Mediobanca behaved more like a Hausbank for Italian companies than like a common regulated Italian bank.   5
equity market, and of the structure of equity ownership, with the proxy voting system
27. As a matter 
of fact tables show that, while the number of firms in which banks hold equity positions has 
increased, there has been a decline in the frequency with which these shares give banks a blocking 
minority position or an outright control
28. At the same time we can notice that still in 1997 out of 
171 large corporations 85% had shareholders owning more than 25%, and 57% had a shareholder 
owning more than 50% of the equity: in addition 77% of the median firm voting rights associated 
with officially traded shares are controlled by large shareholders (owning more than 5%), 
corresponding to 47% of the gross market capitalisation
29. Moreover we should remember that a big 
share of the banks’ asset portfolio is invested in un-floated companies, or in holding-companies that 
remain un-floated, and so the real role of banks is not limited to investors in publicly floated 
companies. 
Another very important feature of the German financial system is the so-called “Hausbank model”, 
where one bank provides most, or all, of the financing needs of a firm, which in return uses the 
services of just one bank. This relation is supposed by both parts to be a long- term one, with both 
parties committed to respect it. As a consequence, when firms have financial or industrial problems 
they look for their Hausbanks’ help, also because the lack of other solutions in the long run has 
transformed the banks in the only financial institutions which can bear the cost of  industrial 
rescues
30: these rescue operations generally end with banks taking, or accumulating, large numbers 
of shares
31. Hence in those cases the banks don’t sell off the shares after the difficulties into which 
the firms had run were eventually overcome
32, and so we can say they turn to be long-term 
investments
33. Moreover, according to Das-Nanda
34 the resources invested by a bank in order to 
build up a long-term relationship would be too costly in the absence of a long-term commitment by 
the client, but at the same time they make future transactions cheaper and easier, and so there is no 
direct advantage in letting the client go bankrupt
35. 
Furthermore, due to the pressures of stakeholders, in particular union officials and labor 
representatives
36, on Germans banks, it is very unusual that a bank would let a big company fail, 
and so the bigger the company, the higher is the probability of a bank holding a large number of 
shares
37. As a matter of fact, big universal banks are commonly perceived to act in the public and/or 
in the national interest, rather than seeking strictly to maximise profits
38. Another feature of the 
financial system is the widespread role of regional and local communities, as well as the Federal 
                                                           
27  Most of the researchers agree on considering these three elements as the founding elements of the German financial 
system. Among others see: Nardozzi (1983), 111; Dietl (1998), 66; Schröder, Schrader (1998). 
28  Emmons, Schmid (1999). 
29 Boehmer  (1999). 
30  Guatri, Vicari (1994), 39. Please see also Ralph (2002). 
31  It can happen that rescue operations lead to the transformation of banks’ credits, or firms’ bonds hold by banks, in 
shares. Guatri, Vicari (1994), 41 and also Neuberger, Neumann (1991), 188-199. 
32  Neuberger, Neumann (1991). 
33  Fiscal optimisation also plays a big role here, as we have to consider that a long- term share block bought in a semi-
failed company implies two different fiscal capital gains: the increase in the value of the company and the inflation 
effect over time. As a matter of fact, when the capital gains tax was abolished in 2000 most of the observers awaited 
an increase in the disposal of assets by big banks.   
34  Das, Nanda (1999), 863-895. 
35  Das, Nanda (1999). 
36  For an example of public officials´ pressions on banks see the KruppAG-Thyssen merger as analysed in Emmons,  
Schmid (1999).  
37  Nardozzi (1983). Not all the scholar have the same opinion, e. g. Berlin (2000), 3-15. 
38  Emmons, Schmid (1999).   6
Government
39, as major bank shareholders: in particular, as these hold big portfolio investments in 
non-financial assets they use them in order to increase the banks’ capital
40. 
Finally we would like to underline that, as often referred in relation with a “bank-based model”, 
Germany is characterized by a less developed capital market, compared with Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
One of the main reasons for the underdevelopment of the German equity market is the absence of 
long-term investors, first of all pensions funds, as the old age security system rests to a large degree 
on the pay-as-you-go principle
41, and therefore institutional investors consist primarily of banks, 
insurance firms, and dependent investment funds
42. At the same time most of the private 
accumulated capital is saved through private life insurance and health insurance. As a consequence, 
this practice reduces the role of the capital market both in the provision of funds and in corporate 
governance, as it means that, simultaneously, the supply of and the demand for capital via the 
market is reduced
43. But we have to consider also the fact that maybe the role of the bank as a 
financial advisor may also turn in a preference for banking credit, i.e. a stronger relationship and 
new business for the banks themselves, instead of equity capital
44.  
The second reason for the underdevelopment of the equity market is to be found in the huge use of 
cross-holding agreements
45. In Germany they developed as “web of cross shareholdings”
46, i.e. 
when company A holds shares in B and C, B hold shares in C, the latter holding shares in A, and so 
on, so there is also a wide use of Pyramid schemes
47. 
Infact, according to the AktG
48, there is only a limit to cross shareholdings  that applies in the case 
of two companies holding more than 25% of each other’s stock: according to it companies are 
forbidden to exercise more than 25% of the voting right in both directions.  
                                                           
39  In 1997 The German Federal Government still controls 8% of the gross market capitalization of the German Stock 
Exchange. Boehmer (1999). 
40  This process can pass through the merger between a bank and a holding company. We would like to underline that 
this is a common feature also in other countries. For example in 1992 the Municipality of Wien, Austria, refinanced 
the city regional bank, Z-Länderbank, through a merger with its industrial investment holding. As a reasult Z-
Länderbank gained possession of a widespread group of non-financial activities, among them the Prater Leisure 
Park, two of the main city’s hotels, an advertisement company, and a large amount of shares of the Austrian second 
biggest insurance group, Wiener Städtische Versicherung. Another example can be Westdeutsche Landesbank, 
whose main shareholder is the Land Nordrhein-Westphalia, that has been under scrutiny of the European 
Commission, because of property deals in the early 1990s, when the Länder transferred to the WestLB the regional 
agency for housing (WFA-Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt), through transferring to the bank a portfolio of real 
estate investments valued 1 billion of Euro. Ruozi, Anderloni (1999). 
41 The pay-as-you-go principle is widespread in continental Europe, and is considered responsible for the 
underdevelopment of the European stock excanges if compared with the ones in the U.K. and U.S., where most of 
the pensions are paid through pension funds schemes. 
42 Boehmer  (1999). 
43  Schröder, Schrader (1998). 
44  Nardozzi (1983). The same idea is shared by Ber, Yaafeh, Yosha (2001), 189-218. 
45  Gorton, Schmid (2002). 
46  Adams (1999), 80-109. 
47  One of the most famous examples of the use of pyramid schemes was Mercedes Automotive Holding, established 
during the 70’s in order to own a 25% block of shares previously owned by the Flick family in the Daimler Group. 
The company was then owned by the four biggest German banks, and was delisted only in 1994.  Another good 
example of a pyramid scheme in the industrial sector is that of Regina, which owns a 26% shareblock of MAN, a 
truck factory. Regina is controlled by Allianz Insurance Group, 50%, Münchener Rück Insurance Group, 25%, and 
by Commerzbank, 25%. We would like to remember to the reader that pyramids are widely used also in other 
European countries, for example in Italy and in Austria. 
48  § 328 AktG.  7
Anyway we have to consider the fact that 25% is often enough for controlling the AGM (annual 
general meeting)
49, and at the same time, two companies holding 25% of a third company’s shares 
can easily reach a full control without breaking the legal provision
50. Empirical evidence shows us 
that, considering just the biggest three banks in Germany, if the three banks voted
51 together in each 
other’s annual general meeting, they would have commanded a majority of the votes in each bank’s 
annual meeting
52. 
A third important reason we have to consider is that according to the German law (AktG par. 135) 
small investors can give to banks the authorisation, the so-called Depotstimmrecht, to represent 
them in the company’s annual general meeting (Hauptversammlung). The bank is enforced to 
expose to the shareholder the different possibilities of using  voting rights, but as a matter of fact, 
often small investors just “follow their bank attitude”. However, some evidence concludes that 
usually the banks just support the management proposals, without having an active role in the 
AGM, that mostly just ratifies with overwhelming majorities the managers’ proposal
53, without 
achieving the shareholder interest
54.  
3  Control of German Corporations: the Role of the Vorstand and of the 
Aufsichtsrat  
The aim of the present chapter is to give some guidelines about corporate governance of Germans 
Aktiengesellschaften (stock corporations), in order to make clearer most of the above statements.  
We will focus only on stock corporations, because for all the 90’s they represented the biggest share 
of the 100 biggest companies in Germany, with an increasing role as the “legal form of the biggest 
companies”. Moreover, as we have focused our attention on the relationships between financial and 
non-financial institutions, and their development in the 90’s, we have to remember that in 2000 
considering the relevant sample, 54 companies out of  58 had the legal form of an AG (the other 
four being GmbHs)
55.   
                                                           
49 Adams  (1999). 
50 Nyborg  (1999). 
51  In that case the author  considered both own shares and shares they voted in proxy. 
52  Emmons, Schmid (1998).  
53  Wenger, Kaserer (1998). 
54  Franks, Mayer (20002). 
55  Monopolkommission (2002), Tabelle III.12, 212-217.   8
Tab 3: Legal forms
56 of the biggest 100 companies in Germany 
Year  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
AG  69 66 71 77 75 
GmbH 15  15  13  6  6 
KgaA  2 1 1 3 2 
KG  4 4 4 3 3 
OHG  2 1 1 3 5 
GmbH&Co.KG  3 3 3 3 4 
SpecialPurposeCompanies  5  10  7 5 5 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Monopolkommission (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002) 
Corporate governance is defined as dealing “with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments”
57. In particular German 
corporate governance, even if partially reformed with the KonTraG (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich),
58 is characterized by the fact that corporate law 
(Aktiengesellschaftsgesetz of 1965, finally amended in 2001) prescribes a two-tier board for joint-
stock companies. The law established a strict division of responsibilities in a company’s 
management. Corporate governance is carried out by the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), while it 
is the Vorstand which carries full responsibility for managing the company
59, and enjoys unlimited 
representative authority. The Aufsichtsrat is also responsible for monitoring the management, 
although practically it acts as an advisory committee rather than as a monitoring panel, except in 
times of financial difficulty
60. 
Special issues, as for example corporate restructuring, changes in the lines of business and other 
strategic realignments as well as the determination of the dividend and the acquisition of other firms 
need the Aufsichtsrat’s approval
61, even if companies’ founding charts can provide the Aufsichtsrat 
with wider competencies.  
In order to avoid that managers supervise themselves
62, what has been defined as “managerial self-
governance”
63, executive directors may not be members of the supervisory board, even if they can 
join in its meetings. At the same time the Aktiengesellschaftsgesetz prescribes that a member of the 
Vorstand cannot be a member of the Aufsichtsrat of a company if a director of this second company 
                                                           
56  
German Legal Form  Explanation 
AG Stock  Corporation 
GmbH  Limited Liability Company 
KgaA  Commercial Partnership Limited by Shares 
KG  Limited Commercial Partnership 
OHG  General Commercial Partnership 
GmbH&Co.KG  Limited Liability Company with the form of Limited Commercial Partnership  
 
57  Edwards, Nibler (1999). 
58  Hommelhoff (1998), 249-259. 
59  Gorton, Schmid (2002). 
60  Baums, Frick (1998), 3. 
61  Drukarczyk, Honold, Schüler (1997). 
62  We have to notice that according to Adams one of the crucial aims of cross-holdings is “ to protect the powerful 
position of a certain group of managers”. Adams (1999). 
63  Nyborg (1999).   9
has a seat on the Aufsichtsrat of the first company, and so the supervisor of the manager is a 
director itself
64.   
The chairperson and the members of the Vorstand are appointed by the Aufsichtsrat, for at 
maximum five years, even if reappointment is possible, and often takes place. 
The Aufsichtsrat appoints, monitors, and if necessary may dismiss the Vorstand, or some of its 
members. The law prescribes a minimum of two meetings every year, and the average figure is 
four/five per year
65.  
In particular we can underline that the AktG gives to the Aufsichtsrat five distinctive ways to 
implement control on management behavior: 
•  According to the § 90 AktG the Vorstand has to provide the Aufsichtsrat with information on the 
company’s business
66, even if some empirical evidences made researchers conclude that this rule 
is not always fulfilled
67.  
•  Every single member can request a special report about certain issues.(par 90-3) 
•  The active participation in planning could be based on the approval of the Aufsichtsrat (Par 111 
comma 4) 
•  All given information can be discussed with the Abschlussprüfer (auditor). (par 171 -2) 
•  The Aufsichtsrat can control the business of the company by itself or ask for an additional 
auditor (§ 111-2) 
The chairperson of the Aufsichtsrat has a special role, as he, or she, holds the deciding vote if no 
majority is found in two rounds of voting by the board. As a consequence the chairperson has to be 
elected according to a two-third majority of the Aufsichtsrat members, thus implying an agreement 
with the representatives of the work force in the Aufsichtsrat.  
We can say that the relationship between the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand constitutes the core of 
the German corporate laws
68, and one of its main difference to the corporate governance in Anglo-
American firms. 
The second main feature of the German corporate governance is the co-determination system 
(Mitbestimmung), whose aim is to settle a company’s internal conflict between capital (represented 
by the shareholders) and labor (the employees)
69: the instrument of this settlement is the 
Aufsichtsrat
70. We used the term “co-determination” in order to describe labor representation in the 
                                                           
64  § 100 AktG. 
65  “…Aufsichtsrat members will thus have to exercise their mandates more professionally. This means more meetings 
and- inevitably- fewer seats”. Breuer (2001). 
66  In particular the law underlines that information has to cover the following areas of the company’s business: 
financial planning and investment plan, labour organisation, the incomes and so on. Every member of the 
Aufsichtsrat is entitled the right to have knowledge of the company’s situation, and the law states how often (at 
least) the information has to be given. § 90 AktG. 
67  Wenger, Kaserer (1998). 
68  Schröder, Schrader (1998). 
69  In particular some authors underline that stronger representation of the employees  implies the presence of big 
shareholders which can counterbalance employee representatives’ requests: this can be considered both as an 
“economical and a political” counterbalance. On the matter please see Wòjcik (2001). 
70  The scope of the mandatory codetermination is defined by the MontanMitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951 (breviter 
MontanMitbestG), MontanMitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz of 1956, by the Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976 
(breviter MitbestG), and by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of 1952/1972 (Breviter BetrVG).    10
Aufsichtsrat (Unternehmensmitbestimmung) and without encompassing participation by work 
council (Betriebsrat) i.e. labor representation at the factory level (betriebliche Mitbestimmung). 
According to the German law every company with at least five employees must have a work 
council elected by the employees and composed just by employees, whose decisions are restricted 
to personnel and social issues. The function of the council is to assure that the management searches 
for socially acceptable solutions for economic challenges
71.  
More important is instead the BetrVG (Betriebverfassungsgesetz) that regulates the composition of 
the Aufsichtsrat in companies with more than 500 employees. It requires that one-third of the 
Aufsichtsrat’s members are elected by the employees, but since it has to decide according to a 
simple majority rule, representatives of the shareholders remain in control. 
The goal of parity codetermination is enforced by the MitbestG of 1976 that applies to companies 
with more than 2000 employees
72. According to the MitbestG, half of the members of the 
Aufsichtsrat must be employee representatives, including labor union representatives, and there 
must be at least one company executive to represent executive employees
73. One of the main new 
problem connected with this system is the fact that worker representatives in the Aufsichtsrat are 
elected just by the German work force and thus fail to reflect the internationalisation of the 
company. For example most of the employees of both Deutsche Bank AG and Allianz AG don’t 
work in Germany and so according to the regulatory frame don’t have any voting right in the 
Aufsichtsrat
74.  
In order to prevent paralysis of corporate decision making, the chairperson of the Aufsichtsrat is 
granted a second vote in deadlock situations, so after two “ordinary votes” failed in providing a 
solution. The chairperson of the supervisory board, and all the members of the managing board  
must be elected by a two-third majority
75, at least with a first ballot. After it, the chairperson of the 
supervisory board is to be elected among the shareholder representatives with a simple majority 
vote
76, and so the control of the Aufsichtsrat remains in shareholder representatives’ hands. 
According to empirical evidences codetermination has substantially reduced the responsibility of 
the Aufsichtsrat, since its first introduction in 1976
77, and in general mandatory codetermination is 
to be regarded as economically inefficient, because it deprives shareholders and employees of the 
right to allocate non-default decision rights to the highest yield user
78. Some literature focuses on 
the fact that the involvement of labor representatives in the Aufsichtsrat influenced in a negative 
way its work as the shareholders can be interested in weakening the role of the Aufsichtsrat in order 
to exclude the labor side from high quality information and important decisions
79.  
At the same time the employees may want to use the firm as an intertemporal insurance vehicle, 
resisting restructuring, lay-offs, and wage reductions, protecting themselves against the business 
                                                           
71  On the matter of the relationship between social and economic challenges we can see: Strätling (1997). 
72  § 1 MitbestG. “In Unternehmen, die in Regel mehr als 2000 Arbeitnehmer beschäftigen”. 
73  Par 7 MitbestG. 
74  “At the same time the composition of the Aufsichtsrat doesn’t reflect the fact that many companies operate 
internationally, and so their problems are increasingly global problems”. Breuer (2001). 
75  § 27 MitbestG. “Der Aufsichtsrat wählt mit einer Mehrheit von zwei Dritteln der Mitglieder,….” 
76  This results in the chairperson representing the most dominant group of shareholders and keeping a much closer 
contact with the managing board. Drukarczyk, Honold, Schüler (1997). 
77  Schröder, Schrader (1998). 
78 Dietl  (1998). 
79  Drukarczyk, Honold, Schüler (1997).  11
cycle or shocks to the firm
80. Empirical research shows that codetermination affects the value of the 
firm, in particular the market-to-book ratio of equity
81, but the results are not unanimous
82.  
Summarizing we can consider the existence of five economically significant block sizes as defined 
by the rights of minorities and the power of the dominant blockholders to influence the votes in the 
general meeting of shareholders. 
A block of 90% or more severely restricts the residual rights of minority shareholders, and above 
95%, the controlling group can compulsorily acquire the minorities’ shares. 
A block of  75% (super-majority) or more gives the controlling group complete discretion about the 
elections of Aufsichtsrat members, changes in the company structure or in corporate charter, issue 
of new stocks, so limiting minorities´ opportunities to special rights, for example to make the 
Aufsichtsrat or the Vorstand liable for detrimental decisions. 
A block of 50% or more provides management control to the major shareholders, but is subject to 
limits due to the possibility of the existence of 25+% minority shareholders, thus entitled with the 
right of veto. 
A block of 25% or more gives veto powers on corporate charter amendments, Aufsichtsrat changes, 
and can provide a substantial influence on the AGM, considering an average presence of no more 
than 57% of the votes. 
A block of less than 25% gives relatively little minority protection, even if we have to notice that 
three shareholders with less than 25% can get together more than 50%, thus controlling the firm.  
Finally we would like to underline that according to the present legal frame it is impossible that a 
single shareholder, even if controlling 100% of the shares, controls all the Aufsichtsrat’s seats
83. 
This gives a  hint that the “takeover threat” to German companies is lowered by codetermination: 
even in case of mismanagement the new shareholders have to handle “downsizing” through the 
Aufsichtsrat, and so, through dealing with worker representatives. At the same time 
codetermination may help the managers to avoid takeovers to the extent that employee interests are 
more closely aligned with those of management than with those of outside shareholders
84. 
4.  The Role of Banks as Investors in Financial Companies 
Most of the studies on the German banking system focus on the role of German banks as long-term 
shareholders in non-financial companies as a distinctive feature with respect to other financial 
systems. But another important feature of German banks, in particular of the so-called Großbanken, 
is that they have developed a net of cross shareholdings both among themselves, and with the major 
German insurance groups
85. Even if the presence of nets of cross shareholdings among financial 
companies is widespread in the whole of Europe, and so cannot be considered as a particular feature 
of the German banking system, it is important to understand how it developed there and how it 
                                                           
80  Gorton, Schmid (2002). 
81  Gorton, Schmid (2002). 
82  For example Baums, Frick (1993) argued that their studies didn’t show a degree of  dislike of co-determination in 
investor so high as commonly reported. 
83  This is one of the main differences to other legal environmental where the shareholder who controls 100% of the 
shares has the right to nominee all the Boards Members. 
84 Heinrich  (2002). 
85   Einecke (2001), 24.   12
changed in the last years
86. If we consider the network of cross holdings between large German 
AGs, as presented by Wenger and Kaserer in 1998
87 we find three different circles in the German 
financial system. 
The inner circle was represented by the two biggest insurance companies, Allianz AG and   
Münchener Rück AG, holding 25% of each other, and being considered as “the spiders of the 
web”
88. The second circle was represented by the so-called Großbanken, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank  and Commerzbank, plus a group of other important banks, as Bayerische Hypotheken- und 
Wechselbank, BHF Bank, and Bayerische Vereinsbank. In the next circle we can find the biggest 
German industrial companies, Daimler-Benz, Linde, Siemens, Hoechst
89 and big public utilities 
companies such as VEBA, VIAG and RWE. 
To analyse changes within this web, we will consider the acquisition of minority blocks of shares as 
a first move on the way to a stronger cooperation among two companies
90, (even if empirical 
evidences demonstrate that this must not be the case
91). Before doing so we consider M&A in the 
banking sector, since they tend to generate changes of scale sufficient to modify both the ownership 
structure of the resulting institution and the efficient allocation of its rights
92. 
4.1  Motives for Mergers between Financial Companies 
According to financial management theory, mergers are generally based on the following scopes
93: 
•  Achieving input efficiencies: in these cases M&A are assumed to lead to more efficient 
production processes and lower cost per unit
94. An example is  the use of the same back office 
operations (IT, asset allocation operations, marketing etc.) for a bigger number of customers, or 
for a wider range of financial services, as for example in case of “banc assurance”
95. Often, 
economies of scale can be reaped by downsizing the branch network after a merger, in particular 
in the retail market field
96 which in most of the countries, and especially in Germany, suffers 
from excess capacity. 
•  Achieving output efficiencies: for example, by diversification of risks, expansion of the 
geographical coverage, or access to new and more profitable markets, and/or by, strengthening 
                                                           
86   Wòjcik, (2001). 
87   Wenger, Kaserer (1998). 1998 is the date of the publication, while the data  refer to the 1994 situation. 
88   Wòjcik (2001). 
89  It is important to notice that most of the companies represent “the traditional industrial areas of Germany, in 
particular Bayern and North Rhein Westfalia”, so the area of the “first German industrialization at the end of the 19
th 
century”. This gives a hint to  historical reasons  for the  role of banks as industrial investors.  On this matter please 
see Wòjcik (2001). 
90  This happens in particular in Continental Europe and can be referred both to regulation and to “political” reasons. 
For example most of the privatization happened through the selling of minority blocks of shares to a group of 
selected investors. See the case of France (BNP, Credit Lyonnais, Paribas), and  Italy (Credito Italiano, Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, Istituto Mobiliare Italiano-IMI, Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni-INA, Banca Nazionale 
del Lavoro). 
91  For example in spite of the fact that ING has a minority block of more than 15% of Credit Commercial de France, 
the latter eventually merged with HSBC of England. This happened also with Bank Austria, that merged with 
Hypovereinsbank, in spite of the fact that Westdeutsche Landesbank has a 10% minority block and an option to 
reach 25%. 
92 Messori  (2002). 
93  Millon, Tehanian (1992), 211-234; and also Berger, Hunter, Timme (1993), 221-249. 
94  Groeneveld (1999), 369-392. 
95 Morrison  (2002). 
96  De Felice, Revoltella (2001), 4.  13
the position in the “domestic market”
97 in order to create a financial basis for future expansion
98. 
This strategy has been followed by banking groups in narrow national markets (Holland, 
Scandinavian Countries, Austria) in order to gain the minimal size necessary for operating in 
international financial markets
99. At the same time output synergies can be referred to 
diversification of financial services offered
100. 
•  A third cause often referred in relation to M&A in financial services is the aim to achieve value-
maximization
101, with the presumption that the more efficient institution buys the less efficient 
one
102.   
Tab 4: Reasons for mergers in the financial sector 
Value Maximizing Motives   
Cost reduction  Economies of scale (reduction in per-unit cost due to increased 
scale of operations) 
  Economies of scope ( e.g. reduction in per-unit cost due to the use 
of the same customer center for several services) 
  Reduction of risk due to geographic or product diversification* 
  Reduction of taxes** 
  Increased monopsony power allowing the firms to purchase inputs 
at a lower unit-price 
  Allowing a firm to receive a credit rating or to enter new capital 
markets  
Increase in revenues   
  Increased size allowing a bank to better serve large or corporate 
customers, and enter the wholesale market 
  Increased size allowing a bank to serve both small and bigger 
customers, with a one-stop shopping strategy 
  Increased size or market share to attract customers due to 
reputation effects 
  Increased size allowing a bank to operate in new markets, (e.g. 
OTC market) 
  Increased size allowing a bank to operate in more risky markets. 
Non Value Maximizing Motives   
The role of the government  The government policy can play an important role in either 
hindering or facilitating consolidation, both among the same 
sector, or different ones. 
The role of other stakeholders   Other stakeholders can play an important role in either hindering 
or facilitating consolidation, both among the same sector, or 
different ones.*** 
The role of managers  Managers play an important role in hindering or facilitating 
consolidation, in particular when the firm operates in markets 
characterized by a „strong human factor” (for example: M&A 
advising)**** 
Source: BIS (2001) 
*We assume that two markets or products are imperfectly correlated 
** According to the national tax system 
*** The role of  unions  or local politicians in the bail-out of failed firms is widely acknowledged. 
****As a matter of fact top managers often “vote with their feet”, i.e. leave their company to work in another one. 
                                                           
97  BIS (2001).  
98 Groeneveld  (1999). 
99 In each of these countries the first three groups have a market share of about 60%-70%, while for example in 
Germany the three Großbanken (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank) have a combined market share 
below  20%. For Details see Tab. 6. 
100 Messori (2002). 
101 De Felice, Revoltella (2001). 
102 Berger, Demsetz, Strahan (1999), 135-194.   14
The different degrees of concentration in the banking system reflect the total number of mergers in 
the banking sector as we can see from a comparison of the following tables, where we can notice 
that, in spite of the fact that Germany has the highest number of mergers in the period 1994-2000, it 
has the smallest degree of concentration.  
Tab.5: Mergers in the European banking sector 1994-2000 




Austria 14  24  27  37  20  5  127 
Belgium 6  8  7  6  6  0  33 
Denmark 2 2 1 1 0  1  7 
Finland 7  6  5  5  2  3  28 
France 60  61  46  52  51  21  291 
Germany 100  117  109  189  240  91  846 
UK 2  4  15  16  14  4  55 
Greece 0  0  3  7  3  0  13 
Ireland 1  1  0  2  0  1  5 
Italy 68  56  45  52  64  30  315 
Luxembourg 3  1  3  9  6  6  28 
Netherlands 2  2  5  0  1  2  12 
Portugal 5  5  1  1  0  6  18 
Spain 4  4  1  5  5  3  22 
Sweden 1  2  2  1  1  0  7 
Total 275  293  270  383  414 172  1807 
Source: European Central Bank (2000). 
*Number of mergers among different banks during the year. 
Tab 6: Total market share of the 5 biggest banks 
 Loans  Deposits 
Sweden 85.30%  83.50% 
Netherlands 81.50%  83.40% 
Greece 74.50%  81.70% 
Portugal 72.90%  79.60% 
Denmark      79%        79% 
Belgium 80.40%  74.70% 
France 46.40%  69.20% 
Finland      68%  63.40% 
UE Average      57%  58.10% 
Ireland  48.20%       51% 
Italy 47.60%  46.10% 
Spain 47.90%  45.30% 
Austria 43.30%  39.60% 
Great Britain  30.30%  32.40% 
Luxembourg 34.30%  28.10% 
Germany  15.80%      15% 
Source: Colombo (2001)  15
4.2  Motives for cross shareholdings among financial companies 
We notice that acquiring a minority block of shares doesn’t achieve any of the previous goals, as 
long as we don’t assume that such an acquisition is the first step towards a full merger among the 
two banking institutions
103, even if this position is not unanimous
104: 
•  It doesn’t increase bank size as long as the two banks remain different legal entities, or don’t 
gather under the same “umbrella group”
105. 
•  It doesn’t result, directly, in any economies of scale, as long as the two banks continue to have 
separate operations
106, or don't agree that one of them will provide back office services for the 
other one. 
•  It doesn’t result in any output increase, at least as long as the two banks don’t agree on providing 
services together. 
According to this thesis, cross shareholding is less efficient than direct merging. Given the fact that 
in 2001 big German banks were still lagging behind in the M&A process
107, we would like to 
understand if any major change happened in the net of cross shareholdings among the major 
German banks and financial institutions. 
As a first step of our research we consider some of the main hypotheses and observations about the 
role of cross shareholdings in the German financial system : 
(1) The cross-holding relationships between the biggest bank and insurance companies have been 
established at the end of the 19
th century, when these companies were established
108.  Empirical 
studies found out that cross holdings and ownership concentration are higher in the oldest German 
companies, while they tend to reduce as we approach the 1990’s and the “IT industrial age”
109. 
According to Gerschenkron, the industrialization of Germany in the second part of the 19th century 
was made possible by the presence of big financial institutions that acted as suppliers of external 
capital as a substitute for insufficient internally accumulated funds
110. This was due in particular to 
an actively state-assisted process of industrialization, realized with the establishment of “special” 
banks in order to provide long-term loans to capital-intensive industries
111. 
                                                           
103 De Felice, Revoltella (2001). As underlined by Messori acquiring minority stakes can be a way to establish new 
relations with foreign banks. For example among the major European banks we can remember Credit Agricole-
IntesaBCI, Allianz-Unicredito, Royal Bank of Scotland-Banco Santander CentralHispanoamericano (BSCH). 
Messori (2002). 
104 BIS (2001). 
105 With the word “umbrella group” we address those mergers that pass through the establishment of a holding 
company which controls the two merging institutions, that remain separate legal entities. Some examples are 
provided by Intesa-BCI, and Unicredito Italiano in Italy or by the so-called 3Banken Group in Austria. 
106 For example after the merger of Bank Austria and CreditAnstalt in 1997 the two banks agreed, with the so - called 
17 January statement, first point, to keep two separate networks of branches  till 2002. We would like to underline 
that the Austrian banking market is characterized by one of the highest numbers of branches every 1000 inhabitants. 
107 De Felice, Revoltella (2001). 
108 As a matter of fact we have to notice that most of the biggest German companies shared also “personal” cross 
influence: for example Allianz was established in 1890 by Carl von Thieme, a former director of the Münchener 
Rück Versicherung, and by the banker Wihelm von Finck. One of the prominent founders of Deutsche Bank was 
Georg von Siemens, who was also the founder of the industrial firm Siemens. On this matter please see: Brendel 
(2001). 
109 Wòjcik (2001). 
110 Gerschenkron (1968). 
111 Neuberger (2000), 11-33.   16
Given this historical explanation of today’s cross-holdings among German financial companies, we 
wonder why they haven't been wiped out in more than 100 years, considering also the fact that after 
the Second World War the biggest German banks were broken up by the occupation forces into a 
number of “successor banks”, each limited to operate in one Land
112. Moreover, we are looking for 
an explanation why, while expanding themselves abroad, the big German banks didn’t change their 
home cross-holding system. 
(2) A second hypothesis states that cross-holdings acted as self-defense against foreign 
companies
113, so as a way for consolidating at home before expanding abroad
114. As a matter of fact 
cross-holdings began to be wiped out in the second part of the 90’s when most of the German 
companies got big enough to face international competition. We also observe that the acquisition of 
big German financial companies was never hostile, and that cross-holdings could be used to 
redistribute resources among the shareholders
115. A third clue of this attitude is that cross-holdings 
were eliminated also as a consequence of foreign investor pressure
116, in particular in the case of 
Deutsche Bank, where after the merger with Bankers Trust around 50% of the shareholders are 
foreign.   
(3) A third hypothesis postulates that the “Hausbank model” requires banks to follow long-term 
strategies, and so banks need shareholders who share the same long-term attitude in their 
investment. We can easily presume that no one is a better long-term shareholder of a “long-term 
financial company” than another “long-term financial company”. According to this hypothesis, the 
growing importance of mutual funds and foreign investors
117 in the biggest German banks goes 
along with an erosion of the housebank model, the banks approaching a more short-term strategy, 
and beginning to reduce their holdings
118. 
(4) A last hypothesis focuses on the “regulatory environment” and moreover on the “German 
Milieu”,  as characterized by an “oligopolistic attitude”. In particular some authors focus their 
attention on the role played by “cooperation” in the German political and social history: according 
to it they underline that the aversion to oligopolistic and monopolistic behavior is lower in Germany 
than in other countries
119. Even if this might have been the case in the 19
th century, we do not 
believe that this holds today. 
                                                           
112 In 1952 the Federal Republic was divided in three banking areas, where in each a “successor bank” of the former 
Großbanken operated. After the “restriction of the regional scope of credit institutions” was  abolished in 1956, the 
three banks reconstituted themselves in 1957-1958. 
113 According to Adams the purpose of cross-holdings is to “protect the powerful position of a certain group of 
managers, whose power was established by widely spread shareholdings and the pooling of voting rights to nominee 
shareholders, against proceedings for regaining shareholders’ control. Protection against hostile take-overs seems to 
be the system’s main purpose”. Adams (1999). 
114 Still in 2000 about 85% of the mergers in the financial sector in the EU were of a domestic nature, so being aimed at 
strengthening the position in the domestic market. De Felice, Revoltella (2001). 
115 Adams (1999). 
116 Neuberger (2000).  
117 Neuberger (1998). 
118 Two examples could be Deutsche Bank under U.S. based funds pressure, and Commerzbank under CoBra 
investment company pressure.  
119 Among others please see: Beyer (2002); Capasso (1996); Guatri, Vicari (1994).  17
5.  Major Changes in the Structure of the German Financial System 
5.1  The Core of the German Financial System 
In order to analyze the development of the cross-holdings among German corporations we will test 
the role of some financial companies in the following way. 
We will consider the German financial system as being composed of two different circles: in the 
inner circle, that we will call the “core of the German financial system” we will find the biggest 
traditional financial institutions, the so-called “National Champions”, while in the outer circle we 
will find the other financial institutions.  
First, we have to give a definition of what are the features, on the purpose of the present research, 
for being a member of the core of the German financial system. In particular we assume that: 
(1) Companies have to be incorporated in Germany. 
(2) No foreign company controls more than 25% of the voting rights or of the capital
120 
(3) Each company which according to 2001 data holds more than 10 share blocks bigger than 5% in  
companies that ranked among the biggest 100 companies in Germany
121 can be considered in the 
inner circle by definition. 
(4) Each company whose directors hold together more than 10 seats in other companies’ 
supervisory boards is considered to be in the inner circle by definition. 
The first three rules are always to be satisfied, and so are necessary, while the last one is sufficient.  
Using the data of the Monopolkommission concerning mandates and cross-holdings among the 100 
biggest companies in Germany
122, we thus identify the following 6 companies as the core of the 
German financial system in 2001: 
•  Deutsche Bank AG 
•  Allianz-Dresdner AG 
•  Münchener Rückversicherung AG 
•  E.On. AG 
•  RWE AG 
•  Hypovereinsbank AG. 
Among these, two companies operate in the public utilities sector, two are banks, one is an 
insurance group, and one is an insurance and financial group. On the purpose of the present research 
our aim is to test the following hypothesis of Wòjcik: “The loss of block holdings is to be referred 
to external holdings, while the cross-holdings in the core, among the top owners themselves, 
remained largely unchanged”. 
Notice that our definition contrasts with common sense about the role of the so-called Großbanken: 
as a matter of fact evidence shows that Commerzbank is not, on the purpose of the present research, 
at the center of “Deutschland AG”, even if it plays an important role.   
                                                           
120 Please see La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer (1999), 491-517. 
121 Wòjcik (2001). 
122 We will consider only companies that are incorporated in Germany and are not legally controlled (ex § 328 AktG) 
by any company which is incorporated in another state.   18
For all the years after 1990 it never fulfilled the rule of 10 blocks above 5%, while it satisfied the 
rule of  ten supervisory board mandates only till 1996. 
Blocks bigger than 5% 
  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Commerzbank  7 7 8 8 6 3 
Source: Monopolkommission (1992,1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
Now in order to verify the major changes in the web of cross shareholdings among the bigger 
German financial companies we will apply to the core financial companies as presented by Wenger 
the following tests: 
•  Every time that a company member of the “core group” holds more than 25% of another 
company the second company is also considered a “core company”
123. 
•  To test Wòjcik’s hypothesis about the stability of the core 
124 we consider the relevance of the 
whole shareblocks held by “core group” companies. 
•  We evaluate if according to the map provided by Wenger (and based on 1994 data) a company 
played a relevant role in the German financial system. 
In particular in order to test Wòjcik’s hypothesis we will procede in the following way:  
If the company A is a core company of the German financial system, the total amount of shares held 
by other “core companies” in 1994 should not have decreased until 2001: 
BLOCK 1994 ≤  BLOCK 2001 
If the company A is not a core company of the German financial system, the total amount of shares 
held by other “core companies” in 1994 should have decreased until 2001: 
BLOCK 1994 > BLOCK 2001 
On the purpose of the present research we will consider the period 1994-2002, and we will analyse 
it according to the following division: 1994-2000 and after 2000. This division follows some studies 
that focus their attention on 2000 as a turning point for the German financial system
125, in particular 
regarding the takeover of Mannesmann
126 by Vodaphone Airtouch
127 as it was the first Anglosaxon 
styled takeover
128 in the German history, with no active engagement of German banks
129 in order to 
reach a commonly shared solution
130.  
                                                           
123 As we have already explained, a block of 25% or more gives veto powers on corporate charter amendments, 
Aufsichtsrat changes, and can provide a substantial influence on AGM, considering an average presence of no more 
than 57% of the votes.  
124 Wòjcik (2001). 
125 Among others please see: Heinrich (2002). 
126 Mannesmann represents a very interesting case history, as it was established in 1890 in the heavy industrial field, in 
particular the steel and mechanical industry. In 1990 the company entered the telecommunication sector through the 
establishment of Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH which during the 90’s developed the D2 mobile operator. As a 
matter of fact in 1999 the company represented a mix of traditional interest in heavy industry (Mannesmann Atecs) 
and in telecommunications (D2, Otelo and Arcor in Germany and Omnitel in Italy). 
127 Höpner, Jackson (2001). For analysis of the relevance of the merger between Mannesmann and Vodaphone in the 
European telecommunications market please see: Commission of the European Communities (2001b).   
128 At the moment of the takeover more than 60% of Mannesmann shares were held by non German investors, in 
particular U.K. 25% and U.S. 15%, with Europe accounting for another 18%. These data fit with Wòjcik’s 
hypothesis of a different role of cross shareholdings in the new so-called high-tech industry with respect to other 
sectors.  19
5.2  Changes in the 1990’s 
As we have already provided a frame for understanding the historical role of banks and insurance 
groups as investors in non-financial companies, we would now focus our attention on the role of the 
named investors during the 90’s.  
We have to understand that one of the main features of the German banking and financial system is 
the presence of ”group competition”, as three major banking groups dominate the financial market, 
and in particular commercial banking: private banks (which include the so-called Großbanken), 
state-owned savings banks (Sparkassen), and mutual/co-operative banks (Genossenschafts-
banken)
131. While subject to the same general banking regulations, each group is distinct in its legal 
and organizational basis. On the purpose of the present research we will focus just on one group of 
banks, the private banks with the legal form of an Aktiengesellschaft, for two main reasons: 
•  They are the biggest German banks, ranking 11 banks among the 20 biggest banks in Germany 
in 2001
132 
•  The banks in the other two main groups, the Sparkassen and the Genossenschaftsbanken have a 
legal form according to which it is impossible to have major holders
133 and in particular they 
cannot be “acquired” by other institutions in a direct way
134.  
Within the group of the private banks, mortgage banks (Hypothekenbanken) play a minor role in the 
reshaping of the “Deutschland AG” as they are controlled by other banks or banking federations
135. 
At the same time Hypothekenbanken are forbidden to hold shares in industrial companies
136, and so 
they are involved in cross-holdings with a smaller degree.  
Let us first consider the network of cross-holdings between large German AGs in 1994, as 
presented by Wenger and Kaserer. At a first glance we can see the presence of three different circles 
in the German financial system: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
129 Although Allianz was among the major shareholders it behaved just in order to maximize its capital gain and not in 
order to preserve the status quo. Dohman, Kerbusk (2000), 78-82. 
130 Vodaphone finally got control of Mannesmann on 30 March 2000 through acquiring 98.62% of Mannesmann 
shares.  Höpner, Jackson (2001). 
131 Deeg (1998). 
132 See N.N. (2002), 497-498. 
133 I would like to underline that the Spitzeninstitut of the Genossenschaftbanken, Deutsche Zentralgenossenschafts-
bank (breviter DZ), is also incorporated as an Aktiengesellschaft. This is a situation common also to the Austrian 
experience where the two Spitzeninstitute of the Austrian Genossenschaftsbanken RaiffeisenZentralBank-RZB, and 
ÖsterreichischeVolksbankAg-Övag are incorporated as Aktienbanken. In spite of the importance of the role and of 
the reform of  the Sparkassen sector, I will not consider it, even if I would like to underline that according to the 
experience of other countries, Italy in particular, it seems possible that if the Sparkassen will be forced to transform 
themselves in Aktiengesellschaften, they will probably build up “networks” of  local banks, that would merge with 
other banks. As an example of this proceeding please see the following merger: Unicredito+Credito Italiano, 
RoloBanca 1473+Banca delle Marche, Banca Intesa+Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza, and during 2002 San 
Paolo-Imi+Cardine. 
134 BIS (2001). 
135 The only big mortgage banks in Germany that are not controlled by another financial institution (not parent 
company) are Hypovereinsbank-HVB and Depfa Bank. Among the others Allgemeine Hypotheken Bank 
Rheinboden is controlled by BHW Holding AG and BgaG AG (Beteiligungsgesellschaft der Gewerkschaften), while 
EuroHypo, the result of the merger of Eurohypo AG, Rheinhyp Rheinische Hypothekenbank AG  and Deutsche 
Hypothekenbank Frankfurt-Hamburg AG, is controlled by the three big banks or financial institutions Deutsche 
Bank, Commerzbank and Allianz/Dresdner Bank. 
136 See §5 Hypothekenbankgesetz.   20
The inner circle was represented by the two biggest insurance companies, Allianz AG and 
Münchener Rück AG, holding shares of 25% of each other, so that it is impossible to define an 
ultimate owner of the two companies
137. The second circle was represented by the so-called 
Großbanken
138, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank, plus a group of other important 
banks, Bayerische Hapotheken- und Wechselbank, BHF Bank, and Bayerische Vereinsbank. In the 
next circle we can find the biggest German industrial companies, Daimler-Benz, Linde, Siemens, 
and Hoechst, and public utilities companies such as VEBA, VIAG, RWE. 
If we try to do the same analysis for 2002 we can see that there have been huge changes in the 
structure of the German financial system and in particular, in the role of the major German banks.  
Just considering the most important industrial companies a first group of reasons for the change can 
be found in some big failures that occurred during the 90’s, such as:   
Metallgesellschaft in 1993
139  
  Deutz AG (KHD) in 1996 
These failures involved traditional German companies in the heavy industrial field, so the area 
where the connections between banks and industries were strongest
140. We would like to remember 
that in both cases we can notice a strong presence of  financial companies among the shareholders 
of the failed company
141.  
Moreover, some of the biggest German companies merged with foreign companies during the past 
years, for example:  
Daimler + Chrysler  to create DaimlerChrysler (car factory) in 1997 
  Hoechst AG + Rhone-Poulenc to create Aventis (chemicals) in 1998 
These mergers reflect an increasing importance of foreign investors, in particular in the case of 
DaimlerChrysler, where the “acquired company” was U.S. based. As a consequence the traditional 
role of German banks was balanced by short-term pressure of international mutual funds
142. 
When instead we consider the financial sector , we can remember that during the 90’s just two big 
mergers involved German banks: 
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank + Bayerische Vereinsbank to create 
Hypovereinsbank in 1997 
Deutsche Bank + Bankers Trust (U.S.) to create Deutsche Bank in 1999
143 
On the contrary, several bank and insurance groups have been acquired during the second part of 
the 90’s: 
Münchener Rück created ERGO through the merger of Hamburg-Mannheimer/DKV with 
Victoria/D.A.S. in 1997 
  SE Bank (Sweden) acquired Bank fur Gemeinwirtschaft-BfG in 1999 
                                                           
137 Adams (2001). 
138 In spite of their size the so-called Großbanken have a market share of just 16%, while the Landesbanken and the 
Sparkassen have a market share of 36% and the Genossenschaftsbanken of 12%. N.N. (2002), 496-498. 
139 For a detailed description of the causes of Metallgesellschaft‘s failure please see: Frankel, Palmer (1998), 219-242. 
140 Wòjcik (2001)- 
141 In the case of Deutz AG KHD, the biggest shareholder was Deutsche Bank with a 47.8% share block, while in the 
case of Metallgesellschaft Deutsche Bank held 16.6% and Dresdner Bank 14.6%. 
142 Heinrich (2002). 
143 Commission of the European Communities (1999b).  21
  ING Bank (Holland) acquired BHF in 1998
144 
  Generali Assicurazioni (Italy) acquired AMB in 1998
145 
Summarising we can state that at the rise of the new century a first transformation has occurred to 
the German financial system: some important banks and insurance firms got  foreign-owned, while, 
due to mergers, some of the biggest German industrial companies got big groups of foreign 
shareholders. Anyway, even if some changes took place in the 1990’s
146, it would be an error if we 
considered  the process as completed in 2000. 
Tab 7: Major M&A involving German companies before 2000 
Name of the Company 
(acquiring) 
Name of the Company 
(acquired) 
Sector  Type of operation  Year 
Deutsche Telekom  One-2-One  Mobile 
Communication 
Acquisition 1999 
Mannesmann Orange  (UK)  Mobile 
Communication 
Acquisition 1999 
Rhône Poulenc (France)  Hoechst  Chemical/Drug  Merger  1999 
Deutsche Bank  Bankers Trust (USA)  Bank  Acquisition  1998 
Krupp Thyssen  Heavy  Industry  Merger  1998 
Daimler Benz  Chrysler (USA)  Car Factory  Merger  1998 
Bayerische Hypo-Bank  Bayerische Vereinsbank  Bank  Merger  1997 
Allianz AGF  (France)  Insurance  Acquisition  1997 
Generali (Italy)  AMB  Insurance  Acquisition  1997 
 
To explain the above changes, let us take a closer look at the mergers between financial companies. 
The merger between Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank and Bayerische Vereinsbank: 
In 1997 the only big merger among German financial institutions in the 90’s took place , the one 
between the two Munich-based banks Bayerische Hypotheken-und Wechselbank and Bayerische 
Vereinsbank. The new bank aimed to focus on a “regional strategy” in particular in East European 
countries and in the traditional mortgage business, following the strategic approach of super-
regional banking
147. This merger is very important according to the following features: 
•  It was considered as a reaction in order to balance the role of Frankfurt as the leading financial 
place in Germany. After the merger the two biggest German insurers, Münchener Rück and 
Allianz, and the second biggest bank would have had their headquarters in Munich. 
•  Bayerische Vereinsbank used its 10% shareholding of Allianz in order to finance a tax-free 
merger, thus underlining the importance of capital-gains taxes in the “mergers among 
Deutschland AG
148”. 
•  The merger fits with most of the theoretical reasons given for mergers, in particular by implying 
staff reductions, cross-sellings of financial products, and strengthening of the market position in 
retail banking in south Germany and in the mortgage markets both in Germany
149 and abroad.   
                                                           
144 Commission of the European Communities (1998c). 
145 Commission of the European Communities (1998b). 
146 Wòjcik (2001). 
147 Covill (1997), 33. 
148 Dönch (1997), 160-167.   22
As a consequence of the merger between Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank and 
Bayerische Vereinsbank we can observe the following share blocks: 
Dresdner Bank: 1.27%, Münchener Rück: 13.29%, Allianz: 6.8%, VIAG:10.5%. 
As we can see in the following table, Wòjcik’s hypothesis fits to the experience of   
Hypovereinsbank:  






22.60% 22.60% 17.63% 13.60%  0% 
 Münchener  Rück 0% 5.80%  5.80% 6.50% 5.05%  25.57%
Total    24.60% 28.40% 28.40% 24.13% 18.65% 25.57% 
Source: Monopolkommission (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
*Since 1998 Hypovereinsbank 
Company  Shareholder  1992 1994 1996  1998*  2000 2002 
Bayerische 
Vereinsbank 
Allianz 0%  0%  0%  17.63%  13.60%  0% 
   Münchener Rück 0%  0% 5.10% 6.50%  5.05%  25.57%
   VIAG AG  0%  14.40%  10.25%  8.23%  6.59%  6.59% 
   Deutsche Bank 0%  0% 4.90% 0%  0% 0% 
  Total    0%  14.40% 20.25% 32.36% 25.24% 25.57% 
Source: Monopolkommission (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
*Since 1998 Hypovereinsbank 
As the biggest block in 1994 was 22.60% and the block in 2001 is 25.57 %, Hypovereinsbank is a 
core financial company. Also the 25% rule is fulfilled. In spite of the fact that Hypovereinsbank was 
not present (as it was established in 1997) in the evidence of Wenger in 1994, we can conclude that 
after the merger of the two Bavarian banks, Hypovereinsbank increased its role as a “core financial 
company”. 
The acquisition of Aachener und Münchener Beteiligungen by Generali Assicurazioni (Italy): 
A very important acquisition in the German financial sector, in particular in the insurance field, 
took place in 1998, even if we can consider it as the result of a 6 years’ control battle, the 
acquisition of the insurance group Aachener und Münchener Beteiligungen (breviter AMB) by 
Generali Assicurazioni (Italy): as a matter of fact in 1997 AMB ranked among the first three 
German insurance groups, so through this operation Generali gained a primary position in the 
German financial sector
150. The sellers were AGF Group with 33.55%, and Dresdner Bank, Allianz 
and Münchener Rück
151, with 21.1%, while another 13% was acquired on the market
152.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
149 In particular the new group would have had a 4% market share of the German credit market, with  8% of the 
mortgage market.    
150 In particular the new AMB-Generali group gained the following market shares: 10% in life insurance, 5.5% in 
health insurance and 7% in property and casualties insurance, with a market share of 8% of the German insurance 
market. Assicurazioni Generali Press Release of 23 December 1997. 
151 After the takeover Allianz remained with a 4.6% and Dresdner Bank 5.1%, Münchener Rück 4.8%. AMB Factbook 
of 1999, 109. 
152 Assicurazioni Generali (1998).  23
From a strategic point of view this operation fulfilled some of the main assumptions we made on 
merger motives, in particular rationalization of the structure of the two companies, and  an increase 
in market power. We have to remember that this purchase was part of a big agreement between 
Allianz Group and Generali Group regarding the takeover of AGF, and the rationalization of the 
two companies’ interests in Europe. 
At the moment of the purchase AMB held the following blocks: Dresdner Bank less than 1.27%, 
BMW less than 1%, Commerzbank 5.25%, Victoria Versicherung Holding less than 3.6%
153. As a 
consequence of this purchase Generali Group and Commerzbank agreed on a close relationship
154, 
which has continued till the present year
155.  
We assume that AMB, in spite of being one of the biggest German insurers is not a core financial 
player in the so-called Deutschland AG. 
As a matter of fact, the first test shows that AMB was not in the core of the German financial 
system both in 1994 and in 2002, as in both cases the role of the core German investors was weaker 
than the one of other investors. 
If we try to apply the 25% test, we face the problem that the only shareholder with a 25% holding, 
so AGF, was not allowed to vote in the AGM according to an AMB’s Aufsichtsrat decision. Hence, 
we can exclude the use of the 25% test, as there was no other shareholder with a 25% share block. 
Also according to the map provided by Wenger for the year 1994 we have to conclude that AMB is 
not at the core of the German financial system. 
Company  Shareholder  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
AMB Deutsche  Bank 0.60% 5%  5% 0%  0% 0% 
   Dresdner Bank 12% 14.70% 14.00%  5.10% 5.10%  5.10% 
   Allianz  1.40%  5%  5%  4.60%  4.60%  5% 
   Münchener Rück 0% 8.50% 8.60%  4.80% 4.80%  4.80% 
   Generali  0% 0%  0% 65%  68% 66% 
Total      14.00%  33%  33%  80%  82.50%  80.50% 
 AGF    25%  25%  0%  0%  0% 
 Fondiaria  Assicurazioni  0%  20%  20%  0%  0%  0% 
Source: Monopolkommission (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
The foundation of Ergo Versicherung by Münchener Rück:  
Another important step in the reshaping of the financial sector is the expansion of Münchener Rück 
in the field of direct insurance services by merging its subsidiary Hamburg-Mannheimer/DKV with 
Victoria/D.A.S. in 1997 in order to create the ERGO Versicherung
156. In particular as Munich Re 
had an 80% shareholding of Hamburg-Mannheimer/DKV and a 23.5% shareholding of Victoria 
Versicherung/D.A.S., it gained a majority of the new group
157. The other big shareholder of ERGO 
                                                           
153 Monopolkommission (1999), 251-256. 
154 AMB Generali (1998): “Commerzbank und Generali Gruppe vereinbaren enge Zusammenarbeit 
Vertriebskooperation zwischen Commerzbank und Aachener und Münchener Gruppe”. 
155 In 2002 Generali Assicurazioni Spa is among Commerzbank’s major shareholders, with 9.9%, and Commerzbank is 
distributing AMB insurance services through its branches. At the same time Commerzbank holds a 2% block in 
Mediobanca, that is Generali’s major shareholder. 
156 Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG (1997). 
157 Münchener Rück (1997).    24
would have been Allianz group, and as a matter of fact after a year the two groups decided to 
restructure shareholdings: Allianz acquired 15.6% of Allianz America and 3.9% of Allianz 
Lebensversicherung, transferring to Münchener Rück a 6.5% stake in ERGO and 6.9% of American 
RE
158. 
The merger between Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust (USA): 
In 1998-1999 another important merger took place in the banking sector, the one that involved 
Deutsche Bank and the U.S. based investment bank Bankers Trust. On the purpose of the present 
research this merger may be considered in different ways. One approach is to view it as a strong 
rush in the direction of re-establishing Deutsche Bank as a top investment bank, and thus unwind its 
traditional relations with the German financial system. However, there is no actual evidence that the 
named merger was the driver of any massive dismissal of assets respect to other core financial 
companies in Germany, nor the bank was capable of selling its “retail bank operations”. As a 
consequence we will not consider the merger between Deutsche Bank and Banker Trust as a turning 
point for the role of Deutsche Bank in the German financial system. 
The takeover of BHF by ING (Holland): 
Between 1998 and 1999 we had two operations that involved major German banks, in particular the 
takeover of BHF through ING (Internationale Nederlanden Group) and the acquisition of Bank für 
Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG) through Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB). The merger between ING 
and BHF can be considered as a major step in the reshaping of the German financial system 
according to the role that BHF played in the German financial markets
159, in particular in the 
wholesale banking field
160, and to the identity of its buyer. As a matter of fact International 
Netherlands Group is one of the biggest European banks, with a world-wide presence, and 
strongholds both in the BENELUX retail market
161(through the acquisition of Bank Bruxelles 
Lambert), and in corporate finance through the acquisition of the UK based Baring Bank
162. In a 
first moment ING acquired the shares owned by Allianz Group, DG Bank, and Münchener Rück 
Group, amounting to 41.8%. Then after a year ING decided to acquire all the outstanding shares
163, 
in order to take private the company, and eventually merge with it. Moreover ING decided to sell 
some investment of BHF, and for example 10% of IKB
164 (Industrie-Kredit-Bank) to Allianz,  2% 
of Münchener Rück Group and 1.4% of Allianz
165. Moreover we remember that BHF held wide 
investments in Italy,  0.8% of Mediobanca
166, and  1% of Unicredito Italiano, which were also sold. 
                                                           
158 Münchener Rück (1998). 
159 BHF is the abbreviation for Berliner Handels und Frankfurter Bank . The bank emerged in 1971 as the result of the 
merger between two German banks with a strong focus on corporate finance: Berliner Handels Gesellschaft and 
Frankfurter Bank.   
160 Wholesale banking is defined as the provision of financial services to large corporate customers. Neuberger (1998).  
161 According to the Commission of the European Community the combined activities were 18% of the total market in 
the Netherlands, and 14% in Belgium. Commission of the European Communities (1999a), 3. 
162 Burgmaier (1998a), 65. 
163 ING (1999). 
164 At the moment of the takeover IKB had a 4% stake in BHF. For a comment of the management about the operation 
see: IKB (1999). 
165 Wenger, Kaserer (1998). 
166 At the moment of the takeover Mediobanca had a 3.1% stake in BHF.  25
This was one of the first times that an important German bank was sold by other insurance and 
banking groups to a foreign investor, that so gained the possibility to enter in the “bulk of the 
German financial system”. 
The takeover of Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG) by Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (Sweden): 
In 1999 a merger was announced that involved the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG), a middle size 
German bank, with retail operations
167 in all the German Länder whose main shareholders were 
Credit Lyonnais and the German trade unions
168. At the time of the merger the bank was in a 
precarious economic and strategical situation due both to managerial problems and to the crisis of 
its major shareholder
169. The bidder was Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB), one of the big 
Swedish banks, with operations in the whole Scandinavian area, and controlled by the Wallsenburg 
Group. The merger between SEB and BfG cannot be considered as a major step in the reshaping of 
the German financial system because of the following features.  
•  The major shareholder and ultimate seller of BfG, Credit Lyonnais
170, was a foreign bank, while 
BGAG  (Beteiligungsgesellschaft der Gewerkschaften), the financial company of the German 
trade unions, and the AMB insurance group
171 played a second line role in the operation.  
•  During the 90’s BfG had focused strongly on savings and banking services for private customers 
more than on corporate finance
172, and it didn’t hold any major industrial investment in any of 
the first 100 German companies
173.  Its merger didn’t reflect any major change in the structure of 
the German banking system
174, as it didn’t involve any other German bank, nor any change in 
the industrial shareholding system. Finally, the purchase of BfG through SEB didn’t reflect any 
structural change in the German financial system as the aim of SEB was to concentrate on the 
retail market




                                                           
167 At the time of the purchase the bank had 177 branch offices in whole Germany, with around 1.000.000 of private 
customers, and a market share of 1% of the German market: in 1998 it ranked N° 5 among the private commercial 
banks in Germany. SEB (1999). 
168 At the time of the purchase Credit Lyonnais held 50% of the bank, BGAG 25%, and AMB 25%.  
169 Burgmaier (1998a), 50. 
170 Credit Lyonnais acquired BfG in 1992 as a part of a bigger agreement between AGF (Assurances Générales de 
France), and AMB Insurance Group. BfG eventually merged with Credit Lyonnais Deutschland in 1993. Anyway 
the bank never turned to be a profitable investment, and was sold according to the restructuring plan of Credit 
Lyonnais. 
171 AMB (1999). 
172 SEB (1999). 
173 Monopolkommission (1999),  251-256. 
174 According to the Commission of The European Communities the combined activities of BfG and SEB in Germany 
would have turned to be around 1% of the market share, in any relevant market. Commission of the European 
Communities (1998a), 3. 
175 The retail market is defined as the segment which concentrates on households and small and medium- sized firms. 
Neuberger (1998), 97-118. The focus on the retail market was underlined also by equity researches. Please see: 
Ghose, Leonard, Vijayarajah (2001). 
176 In retail banking the service has to be offered close to the customers, and so an extensive branch network is a crucial 
factor of competitiveness. Due to the impossibility of gaining market share by improving the service quality most of 
the incumbents founded discount brokers and direct banks in the market segment of standardizable services. 
Neuberger (1998), 97-118. 
177 In particular we would like to underline that the wide presence of barriers arising from the feature of the German 
market made it extremely difficult to build up a significant branch network, without bearing huge sunk costs.   26
According to Wenger  BfG was not a core financial company in 1994. If we test Wòjcik’s 
hypothesis we can see that  
BLOCK 1994  > BLOCK 2001. 
Moreover, the 25% test shows that both in 1994 and in 2001 the company’s main shareholder was 
not a core financial company, and so this fits with our hypothesis.  
Hence, BfG proved not to be in the core of the German financial system 
Company  Shareholder  1992  1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
BfG Bank  AMB  50.1%%  25.1%  25.1%  25.1%  0%  0% 
   Credit Lyonnais  0%  50.1%  50.1%  50.1%  0%  0% 
   BGAG  24.8%  24.8%  24.8%  24.8%  0%  0% 
Total   100%  100%  100%  100%  0%  0% 
Source: Monopolkommission (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
At the same time we can notice that in this period the impact of mergers and acquisitions was high, 
and for example
178: 
•  12 blocks disappeared because companies were delisted or liquidated. 
•  12 holdings ceased to exist because companies merged with each other. 
5.3  Changes after 2000  
We have already underlined the importance of the takeover of Mannesmann as a milestone in 
German corporate governance, which can be considered as a step in the evolution of the so-called 
Deutschland AG.  
One of the major changes in the German financial system occurred when the government eliminated 
the corporate capital-gains tax on 1st January 2002. Most of the observers agreed  that this would 
have encouraged companies to unwind their cross shareholdings
179 by removing a disincentive to 
the selling of long held shares
180. Eliminating the taxation of corporate capital-gains can reshape 
companies’ investment allocations as these will no more be influenced by tax optimization but just 
by risk allocation
181. This should change German corporate structure in particular as the big 
traditional investors, insurance companies and banks, will decide to reshape their portfolios
182, 
investing tied-up capital to expand core areas, without incurring tax charges
183. This expectation 
was limited by the problem compounded with the big size of industrial holdings: if all the banks and 
insurance companies decided to sell off all their shareholdings at the same time they would just 
meltdown the market
184;  there are left two alternative ways of disposal,  a decrease process in 
growing markets, or disposals outside the market. 
                                                           
178 Wòjcik (2001). 
179 Holloway (2001); Breuer (2001), 544-548. 
180 In most of the cases big portfolio investments in industrial companies dated back to before the 80’s. 
181 Deutsch, Nassauer, Quitzau (2001). 
182 Deutsch, Nassauer, Quitzau (2001)- 
183 On the matter of the change in companies’ evaluations due to the new fiscal frame please see: Tamarowski (2002), 
30-32. 
184 In most of the biggest industrial companies the so-called Großbanken plus the biggest insurers own more that 50% 
of the shares. On the matter please see also Heinrich (2002).  27
As a matter of fact Deutsche Bank followed the first way by decreasing its 9.9% stake in 
Münchener Rück  held in 2000 to around 5% in 2002, while other big operations took place outside 
the market through exchanges of stakes, as in the following examples. 
Anyway we have to notice that in the years 2000-2001 some major mergers involved important 
German companies, both in the financial and the non-financial sector (see table 7).  
Tab 8: Major M&A involving German companies after 2000 
Name of the 
acquiring company 
Name of the acquired 
company 
Sector Type  of 
operation 
Year 
Deutsche Telekom  VoiceStream (USA)  Mobile Communication  Acquisition  2001 
British Telekom (UK)  Viag Interkom  Mobile Communication  Acquisition  2001 
KfW IKB  Banking  Acquisition  2001 
Veba Viag  Energy/Public  Utilities  Merger  2000 
RWE  Thames Water (UK)  Public Utilities  Acquisition  2000 
Preussag   TUI  Travel Services  Acquisition  2000 
Preussag  Thomson Travel (UK)  Travel Services  Acquisition  2000 
BellSouth (USA) KPN 
(Holland) 
E-Plus Mobile  Communication  Acquisition  2000 
Siemens  Mannesmann Atecs  Heavy Industry  Acquisition  2000 
Hypovereinsbank  Bank Austria (Austria)  Banking  Merger  2000 
Vodaphone (UK)  Mannesmann  Mobile Communication  Acquisition  2000 
 
To provide examples for the industrial sector: 
  -VEBA and Viag merged to form E.ON 
  -Preussag acquired TUI and the English tour operator Thomson Travel
185 
For the purpose of the present research, we are interested in the following mergers which took place 
in the financial sector. 
The acquisition of Industrie-Kredit-Bank (breviter IKB) by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(breviter KfW)
186: 
A good example of the changed attitude in the German financial system may be the acquisition of 
IKB, a German bank specialized in long-term financing for middle-sized companies (the so-called 
Mittelstand). In 1999 as ING acquired the Frankfurter bank BHF, the two banks unwinded their 
cross shareholdings. In particular IKB sold its 4% block of BHF to ING, while ING decided to sell 
the 10% held by BHF in IKB to Allianz
187. As a consequence Allianz doubled its stake to 19.8%%, 
while Münchener Rück became the second biggest shareholder with a 13.4% stake. Two years later 
the two insurance companies agreed to sell their stocks to Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (breviter 
KfW), which became the major shareholder of IKB with 33.2% of the voting rights. At the same 
time Allianz decided to continue its cooperation in the fields of property insurance and pension 
                                                           
185 As a consequence in 2002 Preussag merged with TUI, Thomson Travel and Nouvelles Frontieres, and transformed 
itself in a Travel Company, thus selling all its interests in the heavy industry, and renaming TUI AG. 
186 As the purchase of IKB through KfW was still on we will not apply the Wòcjik test to this operation, but just to the 
other two ones. 
187 At the moment of the takeover IKB had a 4% stake in BHF. For a comment of the management about the operation 
see: IKB (1999).   28
schemes, while Ergo Versicherung entered into a partnership in the field of asset management with  
IKB
188.  
From this example we can draw two conclusions:  
•  KfW is the most important public bank concerning promotional financing for medium-sized 
companies. So its purchase of 33.2% of IKB can be considered a strategic alliance in the field of 
corporate lending for medium-sized companies, and not a mere reallocation of shares among the 
biggest German financial companies.  
•  The stakes of Allianz had grown in the years to around 20%, but as the company doesn’t have 
any direct interest in the business of middle/long-term credits, it decided to sell its stake, 
continuing with an exclusive cooperation in its traditional business, the insurance one
189.  
Hence both Allianz and KfW decided to focus on their core businesses. This acquisition can be 
considered as a hint of the fact that in the financial sector firms can cooperate in their traditional 
fields of business without owning shares of each other. 
According to Wenger, both IKB and KfW don’t represent core financial companies. Moreover, as 
KfW doesn’t fit with our definition of a “core company” , if we apply the 25% rule we find that 
IKB is controlled by a non-core company and so it is also a non-core company. 
The merger between Hypovereinsbank and Bank Austria Creditanstalt:
190 
One of the major mergers in the European banking system after 2000 was the merger between the 
German banking group Hypovereinsbank (breviter HVB) and the Austrian group Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt. 
As a matter of fact in July 2000 the two banks announced that they were going to merge in order to 
create the third biggest banking group in Europe
191, with a capital of 17.5 billion of Euro and total 
assets of 667 billion of Euro, more than 65000 employees, 8 million of customers and a worldwide 
presence
192. 
This operation is very important according to the following reasons:  
•  It was one of the few cross-border mergers in the European banking system
193: in particular the 
two banks ranked among the first 3 banking groups both in Austria and Germany. 
•  In order to merge with HVB, Bank Austria broke a previous agreement with Westdeutsche 
Landesbank: this is one of the first times, maybe the first one, that a major operation in the 
German banking system is not based on an “agreement” among all the participants.  
•  As a consequence of the fact that Bank Austria’s shareholders received 20% of the capital of the 
new bank we can notice that more than 20% of HVB shareholders were foreign, and that AVZ, 
the former Wiener Sparkasse, got the second biggest shareholder of the bank, with both a seat in 
the Vorstand and in the Aufsichtsrat
194. 
                                                           
188 IKB (2001). 
189 Allianz (2001). 
190 As we have already assumed that Hypovereinsbank is a core financial company, and it ultimately acquired  Bank 
AustriaCreditanstalt, we will not test the role of the new group in the German financial system. 
191 “Bank Austria künftig unter bayerischer Flagge. Hypovereinsbank  wird Europas Nummer 3”. N.N. (2001), 13. 
192 Press Release of Bank Austria AG of 28 September 2000. 
193 De Felice, Revoltella (2001). 
194 According to it one of the major problems was the status of the Österreichische Kontrollbank, which provided 
special purpose credits according to a special agreement with the Austrian State, for example to the exporters. As a  29
•  The new group would have had a share of 20% of the Austrian financial market, well above the 
5% Hypovereinsbank held in the German credit market. 
A last major consequence of the merger was that HVB would have controlled  also the non-
financial investment portfolio of Bank Austria, which controlled about 270 different companies and 
according to it ranked among the first 5 Austrian industrial groups
195. 
The merger between Allianz and Dresdner Bank to create Allianz-Dresdner: 
One of he major mergers in the German financial system occurred when the insurance group 
Allianz, which had long held a block bigger than 20% in Dresdner Bank, one of the German 
Großbanken, decided to take it over and eventually to merge with it. 
This operation emerged to be one of the biggest changes in the “German spider net of cross 
holdings” as it unwinded a 100 years relationship among some of the most important German 
companies far beyond the involved companies.  
Considering this operation from an industrial point of view the merger was a milestone not only in 
German but also in European finance as its aim was to create a “one stop shop”
196 or 
“Allfinanzdienstleister” net
197, so mixing up traditional banking services (Dresdner Bank) plus 
Investment&Mutual Funds services (DIT-Deutsche Investment Trust) with traditional insurance 
products (Allianz Versicherung Group)
198 and with new pension scheme financial products
199.  The 
biggest impact of the merger was on the so-called “Deutschland AG”. As a matter of fact the 
combined portfolio of financial and non-financial shareblocks of the new Allianz-Dresdner Group 
would have been the biggest in Europe, with an estimated value of more than 66 billion of Euro
200. 
It was not a surprise that the regulators welcomed the agreement between Allianz Group and the 
other Munich based insurer Münchener Rück. 
In particular in order to realize the merger, and to avoid to become too powerful on the German 
insurance market thus blocking the merger
201, Allianz had to reorganize its cross-holdings with 
other two top level financial companies, the insurer Münchener Rück AG (number 2 in Germany), 
and the Hypovereinsbank AG (number 2 in Germany)
202. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
consequence of the merger HVB would have controlled the bank with a 49.15% shareblock. At the same time the 
bank would have been among the biggest shareholders of the Wiener Börse AG, the Austrian Stock Exchange, and 
of the Österreichische Nationalbank. 
195 Among the first companies to be sold there were the Real Estate Company Örag  and the beverage company BBAG. 
196 We would like to underline that Allianz-Dresdner is not the only insurance and banking group in Europe: other 
examples are Credit Suisse-Winterthur (Switzerland), Fortis and ING (Benelux)   .  
197 As the aim of Allianz was to create a wider distribution network  for financial services some argued that it purchased 
Dresdner while needing just its branch network and its DIT mutual funds unit. Wagner (2002b), 130-132. 
198 A first move is that more than 1000 Allianz insurers would have moved to Dresdner Banks branches, with 500 
Dresdner clerks moving to Allianz insurance points. Schutz (2001b), 58-64. 
199 We have to remember that the so-called “Riester-Rentenrefom” aimed to introduce private pension insurances by 
side of traditional state’s pensions. Wagner (2002b), 130-132. 
200 Schutz (2001a), 58-64. 
201 On the purpose of analysing  the effects of the merger on the German insurance market the European Commission 
considered Allianz and Münchener Rück as a sole player, as a consequence of their 25% cross-holding. The disposal 
of some of the cross holdings was considered as necessary in order to fulfill competition rules in Germany. 
Commission of the European Communities (2001a). 
202 Reuter (2001a), 100-104.   30
In particular, just considering the cross-holdings among the 4 groups Allianz AG, Münchener Rück 
AG, Hypovereinsbank AG and Dresdner Bank
203 we find that:  
Allianz bought from Münchener Rück AG : 
-  45% of Bayerische Versicherung AG, thus holding 90% 
-  49.9% of Frankfurter Versicherung AG, thus holding 99.9% 
-  40.6% of Allianz Lebensversicherung AG, thus holding 91% 
-  10% of Dresdner Bank.  
At the same time Münchener Rück AG bought from Allianz-Dresdner: 
-  36.1% of Karlsruher-Lebensversicherung AG, thus holding 90.1% 
-  13.6% of HypoVereinsbank from Allianz, plus a further 2.5% from Dresdner, thus holding         
-25.7% of HVB. 
Tab 8: Disposals that involved Allianz and Münchener Rück at the same time* 
Year Seller  Company  Share-
holding 
Buyer 
1997  Allianz AG  ERGO  6.5%  Münchener Rück 
  Allianz AG  America Re  6.9%  Münchener Rück  
  Münchener Rück  Allianz Lebensversicherung  3.9%  Allianz AG 
  Münchener Rück  Allianz America  15.6%  Allianz AG 
1998  Münchener Rück  Berlinische Leben  64.6%  Commercial Union plc (UK) 
  Allianz AG  Berlinische Leben  30%  Commercial Union plc (UK) 
2001  Allianz AG  Industrie Kredit Bank  19.8%  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
 Münchener  Rück  Industrie Kredit Bank  13.4%  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
2001- Allianz AG  Karlsruher Lebensversicherung  36.1%  Münchener Rück 
  Allianz AG  HypoVereinsbank  13.6%  Münchener Rück 
  Münchener Rück  BayerischeVersicherung AG   45%  Allianz AG 
  Münchener Rück  Frankfurter Versicherung   49.9%  Allianz AG 
  Münchener Rück  Allianz Lebensversicherung AG   40.6%  Allianz AG 
 Münchener  Rück  Dresdner Bank  10%  Allianz AG 
*We use a different print when the purchase involved  bank’s shares. 
On the purpose of the present research it is important to notice that all the major share transactions  
took place in 2002, so 9 months later than announced
204. The reason is that all the participants 
aimed to benefit  from the new German capital gains tax free regulation.    
Let us now test the following hypothesis: Dresdner Bank is part of the core of the German financial 
system. 
If this holds true, the shareblock owned by other core companies of the German financial system  
should have increased between 1994 and 2000/2001. As the block held in 1994 was 27.70% and the 
block held in 2001 was 100%, Dresdner is a core financial company. Since the company is fully 
controlled by Allianz, also the 25% test is fulfilled. Both results fit with the evidence of Wenger for 
1994. 
                                                           
203 Deutsch, Nassauer, Quitzau (2001). 
204 All the announced transactions were carried out on 17 January 2002. Allianz (2002).  31
Company Shareholder  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002 
Dresdner Bank AG  Allianz  24.00% 23.30% 22.60%  12.30%  21.20%  100% 
   Deutsche Bank  0.80%  0.80%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
   AMB  0.50%  0.80%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
   Bayerische Hypobank  1.30%  1.30%  1.27%  1.27%  1.27%  0% 
   Münchener Rück  0%  3.40%  9.87%  9.78%  3.99%  0% 
   Victoria AG  2.20%  2.10%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Total   28.8  31.70% 33.74%  23.35%  26.46%  100% 
Source: Monopolkommission( 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
We can notice that most of the non-core financial institutions, as defined by the present research 
reduced their block holdings before Dresdner finally merged with Allianz in 2002. 
This seems to be an evidence of Wòjcik’s hypothesis. 
Finally, we would like to underline that during the period we analyzed the unwindening of cross-
holdings among big financial institutions went along with the creation of major agreements among 
banks and insurance groups, the so-call bancassurance
205. The creation of conglomerates in 
financial services has been gathering pace for about a decade in Europe
206, and after the accordance 
of permission to the Travelers-Citicorp merger, also in the USA, and so cannot be considered a 
feature of just the German financial system. In 2001 all the main German banks enjoyed agreements 









The aim of the present research was to analyze the major changes in the German financial system 
during the period 1994-2001, in particular with a focus on 1994-2000. 
In order to do this we tested Wòjcik’s hypothesis about a different role of block holdings in big 
German companies, comparing the results with Wenger’s map of  “Deutschland AG” and using 
data of the Monopolkommission on shareblocks among the 100 biggest German companies and 
supervisory board mandates . 
According to our research the spider net of cross-holdings was partially simplified, and in particular 
we can consider two different levels of change. 
The center of the Deutschland AG is still represented by the strong relationships between the two 
biggest insurers Allianz and Münchener Rück, and two of the biggest banks Hypovereinsbank and 
Dresdner Bank (now part of Allianz Group). These two “blocks” represent both the major players in 
                                                           
205 Einecke (2001), 24. 
206 Morrison (2002). 
207 Parion Group has a 2% stake in Bankgesellaschaft Berlin which in return has a 5% stake in Parion Holding Berlin 
AG.  
208 In 1992 Deutsche Bank purchased the insurance company Deutsche Herold, and focused it on bancassurance 
products. In the second part of the 90’s it reached a 34% share block (24.35% of the voting rights) in Gerling, a 
German insurer with a strong focus on  credit insurance, industrial insurance and reinsurance services.   32
the insurance market and in the banking market, and can be considered the “core of the German 
financial system”. 
On the contrary, if we consider the border of the German financial system we notice that some 
major changes occurred, in particular:  
Two of the biggest private banks with the legal form of an Aktiengesellschaft (BfG and BHF) were 
purchased by foreign banks, which eventually unwinded most of their cross-holdings with other 
German corporations. At the same time also two of the biggest insurers AMB and Colonia 
Versicherung
209 were foreign hold. Two special purpose banks, Kreditansatlt für Wiederaufbau and 
Industrie- Kredit-Bank decided to intensify their cooperation. 
According to our opinion these changes were the results of the following main driving forces: 
•  Cross-holdings proved to be unable to provide full merger benefits. This attitude was confirmed 
by Allianz’s purchase of Dresdner Bank, and by the disposal of cross-holdings after the BHF-
ING merger. Anyway we have to underline that, like in most of continental Europe, cross-
holdings have been used to strengthen cooperations in the bancassurance field (Parion-
Bankgesellschaft Berlin, AMB-Generali-Commerzbank, Gering-Deutsche Bank). 
•  The importance of the reform of the capital-gain tax was underlined by the fact that most of the 
disposals announced after 2000 took place after 1 January 2002, thus enjoying the new fiscal 
frame, even if since the second part of the 90’s the big banks began to disinvest their industrial 
interests: on this purpose they created special purpose societies that acted as trading units, so 
enjoying a better fiscal treatment
210. 
Finally we would like to underline that the figures reveal that banks can exert influence via their 
supervisory board mandates, but the impact is easily overestimated
211, and so in spite of a 
commonly referred “Macht der Banken” (power of the banks), insurance groups emerged as the 
strongest financial groups at the end of the 1990’s. 
 
                                                           
209 Colonia Versicherung was purchased in 1993 by the former French insurer UAP: in 1997 UAP merged with the 
other French insurer group AXA. 
210 For example in 1998 Deutsche Bank created DB Invest, as a separate legal entity whose aim is to dispose of 
Deutsche Bank’s industrial asset portfolio. 
211 This is in part due to the fact that before of the Aktiengesellschaftsgesetz of 1965, which established a maximal 
number of 10 mandates per person, the most important bankers sat in a great number of boards. For example 
Hermann-Josef Abs, a former chief executive of Deutsche Bank AG, simultaneously held up to 30 seats on 
supervisory boards.   33
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